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SEPARATION OF POWERS: ASKING A DIFFERENT
QUESTION
SUZANNA SHERRY*

What I find most intriguing about Professor Casper's essay1 is its
historical description of the founders' attitude not so much toward
separation of powers, but toward separation of powers questions.
In other words, I am more interested in how the founders approached questions and in the sources of their answers than in the
substance of those answers. In comparing Professor Casper's
description of the late eighteenth-century approach to separation
of powers questions with the predominant way of asking separation of powers questions today, I find that the two are quite different. The difference in approach is equivalent to the difference
Robin West has noticed between posing a "'constitutional question'

. . .

as a normative question about how we should constitute

ourselves [and] as an authoritarian question about the content of
'2
the Constitution's mandates.

I.

According to Professor Casper, the founding generation approached constitutional separation of powers questions with diffidence, with an appreciation of the theoretical and practical difficulty of such questions, and with an awareness that reasonable
minds might differ. Yet they also approached the questions with
apparent confidence in their own ability to resolve them satisfactorily. This confidence contrasts rather starkly with the predominant
contemporary approach to constitutional questions, and it is this
contrast that my comment explores.
As Casper illustrates, the first Congress and administration
worked without many guidelines or models from the colonial or
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WM.& MARY L. REV. 211 (1989).
2. West, The AuthoritarianImpulse in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 U. MIAmi L. REv. 531, 539

(1988).
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Confederation periods. They were aware that they were establishing precedents that might last for many years. They were also
aware, although Casper did not mention this, that the soundness of
those precedents might determine the fate of the new American
Republic. The literature of the period is filled with references to
the delicacy of the "experiment" and to the importance of impressing European nations with America's significance and ability
to prosper both politically and commercially.' The founders truly
believed that the eyes of the world were upon them, and that the
fate of their descendants rested on their efforts.
One might expect that a lack of experience, coupled with an appreciation of the awesome nature of their task, would lead the
founding generation to question their ability to achieve success.
One might then expect frequent references to some standard authority, such as the Constitution, Montesquieu or other philosophers, or prior state or British practices. Instead, the President
and members of Congress sought to use all available
sources-including common sense and their own argumentative
propositions in addition to the written Constitution and historical
practice-to reach adequate, if not always amicable, decisions.
Like the Constitutional Convention itself, the new government resorted to frequent committees and to informal discussion prior to
solidifying its positions on various issues. Indeed, the first administration changed its positions radically over short periods before its
members reached a consensus.
The difference, however, between the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 and the political branches between 1789 and 1793, as described by Casper, is that the Convention delegates were writing
the Constitution; the new government was interpreting and implementing it. Yet both periods are marked by similar expectations
that reason would supplement prior authority. As historian Jack
Rakove has noted, the early federal period was marked by a "sense
of experimentation, novelty, and creativity-and thus of uncer3. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A. Hamilton); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 443 (1789) (Mr.

Jackson); see generally R.

FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE

24-25 (1984);

Adair, Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: History, Dbemocratic Theory, and the United
States Constitution in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789, at
397, 404-07 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
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tainty about results and consequences." ' 4 The founders' approach
to establishing the new government is then especially noteworthy
because of their failure to rely very much on a recently adopted
authoritativesource to resolve the questions that arose. Although
the Constitution certainly did not give much practical guidance on
how to implement its rather vague and abstract provisions, one
might nevertheless expect the new government to pay at least significant lip-service to the document. As Casper describes it, however, the Constitution was only one source among many upon
which the delegates relied while making arguments and resolving
disputes-and it was not a particularly important source at that.
Confident of their ability to reach the right result, the first Congress and administration placed little reliance on outside authorities. They attempted to create the best possible form of government rather than defer to an earlier and more authoritative
determination. As Professor Gwyn notes, practical efficiency was
more important than formal doctrine. 5
II.
Contrast the eighteenth-century approach with the modern approach to separation of powers questions. A significant trend toward narrow, formalist interpretations of the Constitution pervades the modern approach in this area. Instead of relying on their
own ability to interpret the Constitution, both liberals and conservatives seem to view the language itself as authoritative. Modern courts appeal directly to the literal provisions of the Constitution. They consequently invalidate the devices that the political
branches have invente.d to solve the real-world problems of the
"complex system of representative government ' 6 that the founders
created. This formalism can be characterized as an abdication of
responsibility by careless deference to a prior determination.
Three of the most important recent separation of powers cases
are particularly illustrative of this tendency: Northern Pipeline

4. Rakove, Comment, 47 MD. L. REv. 226, 233 (1987) (commenting on Mathias, Ordered
Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REv. 174 (1987)).
5. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers,30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 263 (1989).
6. Casper, supra note 1, at 232.
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Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 7 which invalidated
the establishment of the bankruptcy courts; INS v. Chadha,8
which invalidated the legislative veto; and Bowsher v. Synar,9
which invalidated the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Although
this Comment will not discuss in detail these familiar cases, it will
highlight the contrast between these three significant cases and the
approach documented in Professor Casper's essay.
A. Northern Pipeline
In 1978, after almost ten years of investigating the intractable
problem of the structuring of bankruptcy lawsuits, Congress established special bankruptcy courts. The courts were granted jurisdiction over all suits in which a chapter 11 petitioner was a party.
Because the judges in such courts were not given the tenure and
salary protections specified for federal judges in article III, the
bankruptcy courts were article I or "legislative" courts.
Because the Supreme Court had upheld all legislative courts
since the 1940s, 10 one might expect the Court to uphold the bankruptcy courts. Without announcing any particular standard, the
Supreme Court in prior cases seemed to balance the congressional
need for non-article III resolution of certain issues against the danger to judicial independence. Using that functional analysis, the
Court had upheld the assignment of various types of article III jurisdiction to non-article III courts. Legislative courts, some of
which are known as administrative agencies, became a useful and
practical device for resolving various disputes that federal courts
had neither the time nor the expertise to solve. Bankruptcy claims
seemed to be exactly suited to resolution by legislative courts; indeed, federal judges had indicated in congressional hearings that
they preferred not to decide such cases.
In Northern Pipeline, however, a liberal plurality of the Court"
joined a conservative concurrence 2 to invalidate the bankruptcy
7. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
9. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 398 (1973); Gliddon v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
11. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens formed the plurality.
12. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred.
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courts. The plurality opinion is a striking departure from the earlier practical and flexible decisions about legislative courts. The
Justices posited a rigid separation between legislative and judicial
powers, and invoked a strict formalistic rule against legislative
courts with only three narrow exceptions. 1 3 The plurality opinion
in particular evidences a strong tendency to appeal to authoritative
sources such as the constitutional language and earlier, rigid-rulebound precedent to avoid leaving either Congress or the courts
with any discretion or flexibility.
Justice White wrote a stinging dissent. 14 He characterized the
plurality opinion as an "eminently sensible"' 5 reading of the text
of article III in a vacuum, but noted:
If this simple reading were correct and we were free to disregard 150 years of history, these would be easy cases ....
.. . [However,] [w]hether fortunate or unfortunate, at this
point in the history of constitutional law that question can no
longer be answered by looking only to the constitutional text. In
its attempt to pigeonhole [prior] cases, the plurality does violence to their meaning6 and creates an artificial structure that
itself lacks coherence.'
Northern Pipeline signalled the beginning of the Court's move toward a formalistic approach to separation of powers.
B. INS v. Chadha
A year later, in INS v. Chadha,7 the Supreme Court invalidated
the legislative veto, which was another convenient solution to a
practical problem of interbranch relationships. Six Justices"
joined the majority opinion. One is immediately struck by its formalism and literalism, and by the Justices' attempt to make the
13. 458 U.S. at 64. The three exceptions to this formalistic rule against legislative courts
were the creation of territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts and agencies in which public rights are adjudicated. See id. at 64-67.
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined the dissent.
15. 458 U.S. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 93-94.
17. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
18. The Justices included Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, on one side of the
political spectrum, Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other, and Justices Blackmun and
Stevens.
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decision authoritative by citing as many different constitutional
provisions as possible. A marked contrast exists between the
Chadha approach and the previous constitutional standard for
separation of powers between the President and Congress: the flexible analysis of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 9
Chadha required literal compliance with the bicameralism and
presentment clauses of the Constitution, yet ignored the fact that
the legislative veto is arguably functionally equivalent to this constitutionally-mandated structure. As in Northern Pipeline, Justice
White dissented, stressing that the legislative veto is "an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy
differences." 2 0
C. Bowsher v. Synar
Three years after Chadha, the Court struck down the GrammRudman-Hollings Act in Bowsher v. Synar.21 Bowsher is similar to
Chadha and Northern Pipeline in several respects. First, Bowsher
involved a congressional attempt to solve a virtually insurmountable problem: controlling the deficit despite the political interest of
all of the actors in avoiding spending cuts. Second, the constitutionality of the measure was in serious question. Third, a bipartisan majority of the Court invalidated the Act.22 Finally, the
Court's opinion conveyed a strong sense that practical considerations and historical practice are irrelevant; a literal interpretation
of the language of the Constitution is all that matters.
The majority in Bowsher divided all possible governmental powers and government officers into three categories-legislative, executive, and judicial-and demanded a perfect match between the
power and the officer. Each branch was required to be "separate

19. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
20. 462 U.S. at 972. In contrast to NorthernPipeline, White was the only dissenter on the
merits.
21. 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
22. The Act was invalidated by a 7-2 vote. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan,
Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Stevens, and Marshall formed the majority. Justices White
and Blackmun filed separate dissenting opinions.
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and wholly independent. 2 3 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion
explicitly rejected practical protections of separation of powers, requiring instead rigid structural separation.2 4 Justice White's dissent aptly characterized the majority's approach as "distressingly
formalistic" and labeled the invalidated Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act as "one of the most novel and far-reaching legislative re2' 5
sponses to a national crisis since the New Deal.
D. Summary: The Modern Approach
The three cases discussed above suggest that judges are in search
of a formal authority to displace their own discretion and decisionmaking powers. Unlike the founding generation, many modern
judges, of varying political persuasions, seem reluctant (at least in
a separation of powers context) to engage in the creative act of
judging: the act of reconciling a flawed tradition with an imperfect
world so as to improve both and do damage to neither. Instead of
crafting new answers to new questions, judges rely on existing answers without asking whether those answers are in fact addressing
the right questions.
The results in these cases are not as disturbing as the formalistic
approach. Courts might use a non-formalistic approach and still
reach the same conclusions. In Chadha, for example, the Court
might have reasoned that better legislation is more likely in the
absence of a legislative veto device. I am not suggesting that the
Court has been reaching results that are wrong, or even inconsistent with the framers' intentions. Rather, I am suggesting that it
has been reaching results by a decision-making process that is dramatically different from the one the founders used. I am also suggesting that the move toward formalism is inexplicable-with the
additional experience and confidence we have gained over the past
two hundred years, we should be less formalist than the founding
generation.

23. 478 U.S. at 722.
24. Id. at 736.
25. Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Marshall concurred in the
judgment only. They rejected the majority's formalist analysis. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring). They relied instead on the conclusion that the act impermissibly delegated congressional responsibility to formulate national policy. Id.
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Critics might argue that the contrast between Professor Casper's
description of the political branch and my description of the judiciary is an unfair comparison. Although this critique has some
merit, I would suggest two responses. First, the political branches
(and to a lesser extent the scholars defending and attacking those
branches) lately have been making the same formalist arguments.
Examples include some of the public and governmental debates
over the war powers clauses and the War Powers Resolution, and
the intense focus on the advice and consent clause during the Senate's extensive hearings on Judge Bork's nomination.
Second, and more important, the same trend is apparent when
the judiciary alone is examined. Dr. Marcus' comments 26 suggest
the ad hoc nature of early judicial resolution of separation of powers questions. Indeed, early cases reviewing the validity of state
and federal statutes exhibit a startling nonchalance about sources
of authority.17 In addition to the written Constitution, early state
and Supreme Court cases cite-almost indiscriminately-natural
law, inalienable rights, common right and reason, principles of justice, and common sense.2" These early judges seemed willing to
craft their rulings from reason, tradition and morality as well as
from the written Constitution. Today's judges, by contrast, are
careful to ground their decisions in literalist interpretations of particular clauses of the Constitution, although they tend to be less
formalistic in individual rights cases than in the separation of powers cases discussed in this comment.2"
III.
Some signs indicate that the Court may not be as unremittingly
committed to formalism as Northern Pipeline, Chadha, and Bow-

26. Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early National Period, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269 (1989).
27. By "early cases" I refer to those decided during the first decade or so of the nineteenth century. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1169-76 (1987).
28. For a fuller explanation of this tendency, see id.
29. In fact, although the overall shift has been toward a more formalistic reading of the
Constitution, the difference between cases involving individual rights and cases involving
separation of powers seems to have remained constant over time. In both eras, the individual rights cases perhaps evoked a lesser amount of formalist, authoritarian reasoning.
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sher suggest. Individual Justices have dissented from either the results or the analysis in each of these cases. Justice White dissented
in all three cases, explicitly criticizing the majority's recourse to
formalism.30 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, adopted a
more functional approach in his lengthy concurrence in Bowsher.
These two Justices concluded that the constitutional flaw in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was that it impermissibly delegated
some of Congress' responsibility to formulate national policy.3 1
Justice Powell tried to limit the devastating practical effect of
Chadha by restricting it to cases in which the legislative veto effectively allowed Congress to exercise judicial authority.3 2 He also,
along with Chief Justice Burger, joined Justice White's dissent in
Northern Pipeline.
Within the narrow context of legislative courts, the Court appears to have abandoned the strict test of Northern Pipeline and
silently resurrected the older balancing test. Although the Court
has not acknowledged its failure to abide by the Northern Pipeline
precedent, three recent cases have upheld legislative court schemes
that were very similar to the one invalidated in Northern Pipeline.3 Northern Pipeline may well have been an "island in the
stream," intended to warn Congress against taking advantage of
the Court's flexibility by assigning too much power to legislative
courts. As such, the case appears to have little precedential value.
Finally, the Court's latest foray into separation of powers ques34
tions provides the most hope for change. In Morrison v. Olson,
the Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and upheld the independent counsel provisions

30. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16, 20, 25.
31. 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
33. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding
the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over common law counterclaims arising from claims brought pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (upholding a provision of the Federal Magistrates Act that permits
a magistrate's report to become unappealable in some circumstances); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (upholding the arbitration provisions of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act that provide for only limited judicial review).
34. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act.3 5 The circuit court's opinion
invalidating the Act mirrored the formalism of the earlier separation of powers cases. Citing Bowsher, Chadha, and Northern Pipeline, the court of appeals concluded that neither "convenience and
efficiency" nor even "necessity" can justify the slightest departure
from the literal constitutional structure.3 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the nearly unanimous opinion reversing the lower court.37 A few aspects of the opinion are reminiscent of the formalist decisions. The Chief Justice began with a detailed analysis of the appointments clause and the removal
power,38 turning only later and more briefly to the overarching
question of whether the independent counsel provisions interfered
with the functioning of any of the branches.3 9 He devised a fourpart test to determine whether the independent counsel was an
"inferior" officer for purposes of the appointments clause.4 0 The
opinion also focused some attention on whether various authorized
activities of the independent counsel were "judicial" or "executive"
in nature, although the Chief Justice carefully refrained from
drawing any clear demarcation between the two types of authority.
In large part, however, the majority opinion eschewed completely the formalism of recent years. It focused on the purposes of
various constitutional provisions, on the practical consequences of
various actions, and on the underlying notion of independent and
interdependent branches, rather than on the rigid separation of
powers. The opinion is indeed striking in its rejection of formalism.
The discussion of each issue is permeated with evidence that the
majority's central concern was protecting the independent functioning of each branch, rather than adhering to the literal language
of minor provisions regardless of the cost to the efficiency and the
integrity of the federal system.

35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-596 (1978), amended by The Independent Counsel Reauthorization
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (West Supp. 1988).
36. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
37. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision and only Justice Scalia dissented.
38. 108 S. Ct. at 2608-20.
39. Id, at 2620-22. This progression drew from Justice Scalia-whose analysis of separation of powers was both formalist and ultimately petty-the entirely appropriate remark
that "[the majority's emphasis] has it backwards." Id. at 2625 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2608-09.
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After concluding that the appointments clause by its terms did
not prohibit interbranch appointments, the Chief Justice noted
that such appointments might be forbidden when they have "the
potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to one of
the branches." 41 He began his discussion of article III by remarking that "[t]he purpose of [prohibiting the assignment of extra-judicial duties to the federal judiciary] is to help ensure the
independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent the judiciary
from encroaching into areas reserved for the other branches."4 2 In
determining that the responsibilities assigned to the independent
counsel did not encroach on the executive branch, Rehnquist repeatedly used words and phrases indicating flexibility and attention to practical effect. He said that the termination power of section 596(b)(2) was not a "significant judicial encroachment" on,
nor posed a "sufficient threat of judicial intrusion" into executive
matters. 43 Furthermore, the Chief Justice said that the Special Division, empowered to appoint independent counsel, was "sufficiently isolated" from the independent
counsel to avoid tainting
44
the independence of the judiciary.
The majority opinion exhibited a similar avoidance of rigid rules
in its discussion of the Act's limits on executive removal of independent counsel.45 Although no constitutional provisions directly
govern the removal of executive officers by means other than impeachment, a long line of precedent limits Congress' ability to control such removals. Justice Scalia accused the majority of "gutting"
one such precedent, 48 Humphrey's Executor v. United States,47
but the opinion clearly did at least as much damage to the even
more seminal Myers v. United States.48 Both cases established
clearly defined rules for removal of executive officers. Myers held
that the President could remove executive officers at will;

41. Id. at 2611.
42. Id. at 2612.
43. Id. at 2614-15.
44. Id. at 2615.
45. Id. at 2616-20. The independent counsel may be removed only upon a showing of
"'good cause.'" Id. at 2616.
46. Id. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
48. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Humphrey's Executor qualified that holding by allowing some limitations on the removal of "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial"
executive officers.
The Morrison decision replaced both of these rules with a flexible standard: Congress may limit presidential removal power unless it is "essential to the President's proper execution of his Article II powers" that the officer be removable at will.49 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's application of this new standard illustrated its flexibility. His discussion was replete with words and phrases that are soft
around the edges: the "'good cause'" provision does not "unduly
trammel[]" nor "impermissibly burden[]" executive authority;5"
the need to control the independent counsel's discretion is not "so
central to the functioning of the Executive Branch" as to require
removal at will;51 the Attorney General retains "ample authority"
to control the independent counsel.52 The Chief Justice concluded:
"We do not think that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently deprives the President of control over the independent
counsel to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obliga5' 3
tion to ensure the faithful execution of the laws."
The most striking portion of the opinion was its discussion of
general separation of powers principles. The Court framed the
question as "whether the Act, taken as a whole, violates the principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the role of
the Executive Branch. ' 54 It began by observing that "we have
never held that the Constitution requires that the three Branches
of Government 'operate with absolute independence.' "55True to
this observation, the rest of the discussion focused on whether the
Act constituted a legislative or judicial "usurpation" of executive

49. 108 S. Ct. at 2619. In the process, the majority engaged in a little revisionist history in
its interpretation of Myers. It read Myers as limiting congressional involvement in the removal process, rather than as protecting presidential prerogatives. Id. at 2618. Because the
termination of an independent counsel, however limited the President may be, does not
involve Congress, the majority found Humphrey's Executor more analogous than Myers.
See id.at 2619.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2620.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
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functions such that it "'disrupts the proper balance between the
coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.' "156 It is difficult to imagine a less formalist or more functional analysis of the
questions raised by the independent counsel provisions.
IV.
It is tempting to predict that Morrison signals the end of the
Court's formalist era in separation of powers. Several factors counsel caution, however. First, Justice Scalia's clamorous demand for
strict separation reminds us that at least one member of the Court
will continue to press for formalist analysis. Second, Justice Kennedy's views on this issue are still completely unknown. Third, although the flavor of the opinion is anti-formalist, its emphasis is
more on the formalities of highly technical clauses than on the general doctrine of separation of powers.
Most importantly, however, the Morrison case raised questions
that do not easily lend themselves to a formalist analysis. The rigid
demarcation in function among the branches is found more in the
structure than in the language of the Constitution, and literalism
thus tends to be unavailing in these circumstances. Furthermore,
the strict rules about removal of executive officers derive from judicial precedent rather than from the Constitution. Moreover, a
number of constitutional provisions affirmatively support the independent counsel scheme. These include the provisions that Con57
gress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the courts
and may enforce not only its own enumerated powers, but also
those of the other branches of the federal government.5" It is easy
56. Id. at 2621 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).

57. US. CONST. art. II, § 2.
58. Id. art. I, § 8.Ironically, Justice Scalia, who attempted to insist on a literal interpretation of the Constitution, ignored this portion of the necessary and proper clause. He asserted that the ordinary presumption of constitutionality of statutes did not apply in interbranch disputes, because the branches are co-equal. 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Under the necessary and proper clause, however, Congress has the power to
enact all laws necessary and proper for the execution of executive powers (as well as congressional and judicial powers). The independent counsel act, therefore, like any other statute, is presumptively constitutional under the broad interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause that has been the law since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819).
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to make an argument that a law that promotes investigation and
prosecution of wrongdoing in the executive department is a legitimate exercise of the power to enforce the executive's constitutional
responsibilities. 9
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion in Morrison provides an interesting and refreshing contrast to the clause-bound rigidity of recent cases. Professor Casper's essay shows that the majority's approach to separation of powers is closer to the approach of the
framers than is the approach of Justice Scalia, who repeatedly purports to rely on original intent. I tend to be suspicious of reliance
on the framers' views and practices, because I do not find such
intent dispositive of contemporary constitutional questions. To the
extent, however, that Casper's historical analysis illuminates contemporary separation of powers doctrine, I would suggest that the
framers' way of approaching the questions is as important as their
way of answering them.

59. Just as this comment went to press, the Supreme Court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission. Mistretta v. United States,
57 U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1989). Justice Blackmun, writing for all the Justices except
Justice Scalia, took a decidedly functionalist approach; Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), was prominently cited. 57
U.S.L.W. at 4107. This result suggests, perhaps, that Morrison v. Olson might indeed portend a new trend in separation of powers.
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